On March 2, 2011, Publishers Weekly reported that HarperCollins would limit its library e-book licenses to a maximum of 26 loans per title, beginning March 7. Librarians learned of the change not from the publisher directly but through a letter from Steve Potash, then CEO of OverDrive, the library e-book wholesaler. Once a title reached 26 checkouts, the report said, libraries would have to purchase a new license. Twenty-six loans, or roughly a year of availability for a high-demand title.
That number is the artifact. It is small enough to fit in a sentence and large enough to have shaped a decade of library acquisition math. What follows is not a verdict on whether the cap was right. It is an attempt to read the clause as a document — to see what it converted, what it traveled through, and what it left unresolved.
What the cap actually changed
Before 2011, HarperCollins sold e-books to libraries under a perpetual-access model. A library bought a license and could lend the title indefinitely. The e-book did not wear out, did not go missing, did not need rebinding. In print terms, it was a copy that never left the shelf.
The 26-loan cap converted that indefinite license into a metered one. Instead of owning access in perpetuity, a library was buying a fixed number of circulations. When the meter ran out, the library bought again. The practical effect was to make a digital license behave, in accounting terms, more like a physical copy: a copy that circulates a finite number of times before it must be replaced.
That analogy is not incidental. It is the whole argument. A physical book in a library collection circulates until it falls apart, and then the library buys another. Publishers have long priced print library copies at a discount to consumer editions, on the theory that library circulation is a form of marketing and a public good. The 26-loan cap extended that logic to digital: if a library e-book is going to be lent like a print book, it should be priced and replaced like one.
The publisher’s stated rationale
HarperCollins did not leave the rationale implicit. In an open letter to librarians reported by Publishers Weekly, Josh Marwell, then president of sales, wrote that the publisher’s library e-book policies were 10 years old and dated from “a time when the number of e-readers was too small to measure.” He stated that the previous policy of selling e-books to libraries in perpetuity, if left unchanged, would “undermine the emerging e-book eco-system, hurt the growing e-book channel, place additional pressure on physical bookstores, and in the end lead to a decrease in book sales and royalties paid to authors.”
Marwell also described the practical shape of the new terms: the 26 checkouts would offer about “a year of availability for titles with the highest demand, and much longer for other titles and core backlist.” Once a license reached 26 checkouts, a new license would be purchased at a lower price pegged to the paperback price.
That last detail matters more than it is usually given credit for. The cap was not a flat repricing. It was a repricing tied to a specific analogy — the paperback — and a specific expectation about demand. High-demand titles would burn through 26 loans in a year. Backlist titles might take a decade. The cap was designed to be asymmetric.
The librarian’s counter-argument was a budget calculation
The reaction from librarians was swift and, in the pages of Publishers Weekly, largely framed as outrage. But the more durable response was arithmetic. In 2021, when HarperCollins completed its acquisition of Houghton Mifflin Harcourt’s trade publishing division, the terms of Houghton’s library e-books changed. A notice to library customers said that as of August 1, Houghton e-book titles would be licensed under HarperCollins’ 26-lend metered access model, one copy/one user. Previously, Houghton had offered libraries trade e-book licenses on a one copy/one user perpetual access model, with prices close to the price of physical books — terms the trade press described as among the most popular and favorable in the library e-book market.
E-books purchased before August 1 would remain under Houghton’s previous model. Pre-orders with a street date of August 1 or later would be delivered under the metered access model.
Michael Blackwell, a librarian at St. Mary’s County in Maryland, wrote on the ReadersFirst blog that HarperCollins’ 26-lend model and pricing remained the most popular and favorable terms offered by the major publishers. He cited Houghton’s prior prices — $8.95 for The Giver, $13.95 for The Hobbit, perpetual access — and said that a 26-circ metered license at around those prices would still be considered favorable. “That price range for a 26-circ metered license seems reasonable,” he told Publishers Weekly, “offering us about what we’d expect from a physical copy of the book and respecting the publishers’ concerns about e-books being forever.”
He also drew a distinction that is easy to miss. “At least the license is per-circ and not the ‘exploding’ time-based licenses [offered by the other major publishers],” he wrote. A per-circ license expires after a set number of loans. A time-based license expires after a set period, regardless of use. For a library, the difference is the difference between paying for circulation and paying for shelf time. Blackwell’s preference for the former is a preference for a model in which unused capacity is not wasted.
And yet he was not endorsing the model wholesale. “Per-circ has been advantageous for publishers and library vendors, not so great for libraries,” he noted. The same terms could be both reasonable and unfavorable, depending on which side of the transaction you sat.
The cap as a portable instrument
The 2011 announcement is the origin story. The 2021 migration is the more revealing event.
When HarperCollins acquired Houghton Mifflin Harcourt’s trade division for roughly $349 million, it did not merely acquire titles. It acquired the right to set licensing terms for those titles. The 26-lend model, which had begun as one publisher’s hedge against perpetual licenses, became a term that could be applied to an entire acquired catalog. Libraries that had bought Houghton e-books under perpetual access kept those licenses. But new titles, and new purchases of existing titles, would arrive under the meter.
This is the part of the story that is not about fairness. It is about reach. A licensing term is only as consequential as the number of catalogs it governs. In 2011, the 26-loan cap applied to HarperCollins titles. In 2021, it applied to HarperCollins titles plus Houghton Mifflin Harcourt titles. The clause did not change. Its footprint did.
For libraries, that means the practical question is not whether any single publisher’s terms are reasonable. It is how many catalogs a single set of terms can reach through corporate consolidation. The 26-loan cap is a unit of account. Its meaning depends on the per-circ price attached to it, and the per-circ price depends on the negotiating position of the library. When one publisher controls more titles, the library’s position weakens.
What the cap is not
It is worth being precise about what the 26-loan cap is not, because the term is often used loosely.
It is not a time-based license. A time-based license — what Blackwell called an “exploding” license — expires after a fixed period, whether or not the title has circulated. A per-circ license expires after a fixed number of loans. The distinction matters for collection management. A library that buys a time-based license for a title that nobody borrows has wasted the money. A library that buys a per-circ license for the same title has lost nothing but the opportunity cost of the initial purchase.
It is not a ban on library lending. HarperCollins continued to license e-books to libraries. Simon & Schuster and Macmillan, as of the 2011 report, did not license e-books to libraries at all. The 26-loan cap was a restriction within a market, not an exit from it.
It is not a fixed price. The cap sets the number of loans. The price per loan is set separately, and it has varied. Marwell said in 2011 that replacement licenses would be priced lower, pegged to paperback. Blackwell in 2021 described the pricing as favorable relative to other major publishers. The cap is a quantity term, not a price term.
The asymmetry that gets lost
Here is a question that neither the publisher’s letter nor the librarian’s response addresses directly: what happens to a title that never reaches 26 checkouts?
For a high-demand frontlist title, 26 loans might be consumed in weeks. For a midlist or backlist title, 26 loans might take years, or might never be reached at all. In that case, the metered license is functionally perpetual. The library pays once and lends indefinitely, because the meter never runs out.
This asymmetry is where the real budget story sits. The 26-loan cap is a constraint on popular titles. It is not a constraint on the long tail. A library system that buys heavily in frontlist bestsellers will feel the cap acutely, replacing licenses every year. A library system that buys deeply in backlist and scholarly titles will barely notice it. The cap redistributes library spending toward the titles that circulate most, which is to say toward the titles that are already most commercially successful.
Whether that is a feature or a bug depends on what you think a library is for. If the library’s mission is to provide access to the most in-demand titles, the cap is a tax on success. If the library’s mission is to preserve a broad and diverse collection, the cap is largely irrelevant, because the titles that matter most to that mission are the ones that circulate least.
The contested evidence on displacement
The argument for metered access rests on a claim about substitution: that library e-lending displaces retail sales. If that claim is true, the cap is a reasonable response. If it is false, the cap is a rent extraction.
The most substantial recent attempt to measure that substitution is a 2026 study by Jéssica Dutra and Robert Stoner of Secretariat Advisors, prepared for the Association of American Publishers and the Authors Guild. The study reports that consumer print sales decline by approximately 0.85 to 1.0 percent for every one-percentage-point increase in the share of e-books in public libraries, with adult fiction at the upper end of that range. It also reports that a 25 percentage-point increase in e-book share of a title, holding total checkouts constant, is associated with up to a 7 percent decline in retail sales, varying by genre and audience.
The study’s front matter discloses that it was undertaken at the request of the AAP and the Authors Guild, and that the empirical analyses and findings belong entirely to Secretariat Advisors. That disclosure does not make the findings wrong. It does mean they should be read as a brief in an argument, not as neutral measurement. The framing — “harm to commercial markets,” libraries “cannibalizing print collections” — is advocacy language embedded in a document presented as empirical. The regressions may be sound. The interpretation is contested.
What the study does not do is measure the effect of the 26-loan cap specifically. It measures the relationship between library e-lending and retail sales. The cap is one variable in that relationship, not the subject of the analysis. No retrieved source establishes that the cap caused a measurable decline in library circulation, book sales, or author royalties. The cap is documented. Its effects are inferred.
What the cap left open
The 26-loan cap is now more than a decade old. It has survived a change in corporate ownership, a major acquisition, and a decade of debate about library e-lending. It has been called reasonable and unfavorable by the same librarian in the same interview. It has been defended as a hedge against perpetual licenses and criticized as a tax on circulation.
What it has not done is settle the underlying question: what is a library e-book for? Is it a copy of a book, to be lent and replaced like a physical copy? Is it a service, to be provided at a price that reflects its public value? Is it a marketing channel, to be subsidized in the interest of discovery? The 26-loan cap answers that question one way. The librarians who negotiated against it answered another. The publishers who have since adopted similar terms answered a third.
The useful next question is not whether the cap was right. It is what happens to a library’s collection when the most popular titles are metered and the rest are not. That is a question about collection development, about the relationship between circulation and mission, and about what a library budget is actually buying when it buys a license instead of a book. It is a question that the 26-loan cap made visible, and that no one has yet answered.
FAQ
What is a metered-access license?
A license that permits a set number of circulations before it expires. The 26-loan cap is a metered-access model: a library can lend a title 26 times, after which it must purchase a new license.
How does a per-circ license differ from a time-based license?
A per-circ license expires after a set number of loans. A time-based license expires after a set period, regardless of use. Librarians have generally preferred per-circ terms because unused capacity is not wasted.
Did the 26-loan cap apply to all publishers?
No. It was a HarperCollins policy. As of the 2011 report, Simon & Schuster and Macmillan did not license e-books to libraries at all. Other publishers have adopted different models, including time-based licenses.
What happened to Houghton Mifflin Harcourt titles after the HarperCollins acquisition?
As of August 1, 2021, new Houghton e-book titles were licensed under HarperCollins’ 26-lend metered access model. Titles purchased before that date remained under Houghton’s previous perpetual-access model.
Does the 26-loan cap still exist?
The retrieved sources document the policy as announced in 2011 and extended to Houghton titles in 2021. They do not establish the current terms. Publishers revise licensing terms, and libraries negotiate individually. The cap should be understood as a documented historical policy, not necessarily as a current one.